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Note
Grubart v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock
Company: A Reasonable Conclusion to the
Debate on Admiralty Tort Jurisdiction
I. Introduction
In August and September, 1991, Great Lakes Dredge &
Dock Company ("Great Lakes") replaced the pilings of a pier
that supported the Kinzie Street Bridge pursuant to a contract
with the City of Chicago.' The pilings kept ships from bumping
the pier.2 Great Lakes carried out the procedure with the use of
two barges; one carried replacement pilings and the other a
crane to pull out the old pilings and place the new ones.3 The
barge carrying the crane was anchored to the river-bed with
long metal legs, or "spuds".4
On April 13, 1992, 250 million gallons of water broke
through the walls of a tunnel under the Chicago River and
flooded the basements of buildings in downtown Chicago. 5 The
city shut off electrical power in the flooded area, evacuated nu-
merous buildings, including City Hall, the Board of Trade and
the Sears Tower, and lowered the level of the river.6 On April
15, 1992, the downtown area was declared a federal disaster
1. See Grubart v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 115 S. Ct. 1043, 1046
(1995).
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. See id. "Spuds" are defined as "[a] sharp-pointed vertical post or pile, com-
monly one of four, which can be forced by a tackle or by power through a socket in a
floating or land dredge or scow to anchor it." WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY
2243 (2d ed. 1988).
5. See Michael Abramowitz, Thousands Evacuated as Flooding Swamps Chi-
cago's Financial District, WASH. POST, Apr. 14, 1992, at A3.
6. See id.
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area by President Bush.7 A week later, damage estimates had
passed the $1 billion mark and fifteen buildings remained
closed."
The flood's effect went well beyond physical damage to the
city. For example, six days after the flood, Great Lakes, the
largest dredging contractor in the United States,9 announced
that it would refrain from making its initial public offering until
the issues of liability were settled.10 Two city engineers were
fired, the Acting Transportation Commissioner was forced to re-
sign, and others were reprimanded." In addition, the incident
added fuel to the ongoing debate concerning the privatization of
city functions. 12
Three days after the flood, the first lawsuit was filed.' 3 In
the suit, Great Lakes and the City of Chicago were named as
defendants.' 4 The suits15 were filed in state court.1 6 The vic-
tims alleged that the City of Chicago had not properly main-
tained the tunnel and that Great Lakes had negligently
weakened the tunnel in the course of replacing the pilings.17
Great Lakes then brought suit in federal court seeking protec-
tion under the Limitation of Vessel Owner's Liability Act 8 as
well as requesting indemnity and contribution from the city.' 9
James B. Grubart, Inc. and the city moved to dismiss the fed-
7. See Thomas M. Burton, Many Chicago Buildings Still Flooded; Power Ex-
pected to Remain Off for Days, WALL ST. J., Apr. 16, 1992, at A12 [hereinafter
Chicago Buildings].
8. See Jeff Bailery & Thomas M. Burton, Flood Damage in Chicago Seen Over
$1 Billion, WALL ST. J., Apr. 20, 1992, at A3.
9. See Great Lakes Dredge Puts Initial Offering on Hold, WALL ST. J., Apr. 20,
1992, at A7.
10. See id.
11. See Michael Abramowitz, 2 Chicago Officials Ousted; Daley Moves Against
5 Others Over Flood, WASH. POST, Apr. 23, 1992, at Al.
12. See Thomas F. Roeser, Chicago Flood's Lesson, WALL ST. J., May 28, 1992,
at A20. "What citizens are learning is that while there has been some private-
sector responsibility for the flood crisis, government failure worsened the prob-
lem." Id.
13. See Chicago Buildings, supra note 7, at A12.
14. See id.
15. Many victims of the flood brought suit. See Grubart, 115 S. Ct. at 1047.
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. 46 U.S.C. §§ 181-96 (1994).
19. See Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. City of Chicago, 3 F.3d 225, 226
(7th Cir. 1993).
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eral suits for lack of admiralty jurisdiction.20 The District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois granted the motion, but the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed. 21 The United
States Supreme Court affirmed the Seventh Circuit and re-
manded the case.22
The issue before the Court was whether a federal court has
admiralty tort jurisdiction when a party alleges that a dredging
company weakened an underground tunnel, causing the tunnel
to give way and resulting in a flood.23 Before answering the
main question, however, the Court first had to determine what
jurisdictional test to use. The Court noted that the traditional
test for admiralty tort jurisdiction was simply a matter of deter-
mining whether or not the alleged tort occurred on navigable
water.24 The Court also noted that it had modified this test in a
series of cases which began limiting admiralty jurisdiction by
requiring a certain amount of connection between traditional
maritime activity and the events giving rise to the lawsuit in
addition to the location requirement. 25 However, because the
Court, in each of these relevant cases, neither mandated nor
precluded the use of any particular test whenever admiralty
tort jurisdiction was at issue, the circuit courts failed to adopt a
uniform test for admiralty tort jurisdiction. 26 In Grubart, the
Court forsook the various circuit court tests and mandated the
use of its test for all admiralty tort jurisdiction questions.27 As
set forth by the Grubart Court, this test requires satisfying both
conditions of locality and a certain maritime connection. 28 As
will be seen, both aspects of this test have roots in the history of
the debate over admiralty tort jurisdiction.
The Court's decision in Grubart has resulted in uniformity
amongst the circuits.29 However, as the existence of the concur-
20. See id.
21. See id. at 225.
22. See Grubart, 115 S. Ct. at 1055.
23. See id. at 1046.
24. See id. at 1047.
25. See id. at 1048.
26. See infra notes 166-80, 220-22, 224-31 and accompanying text.
27. Grubart, 115 S. Ct. at 1055.
28. Id. at 1048.
29. See Coats v. Penrod Drilling Co., 61 F.3d 1113, 1118 (5th Cir. 1995) (find-
ing that Grubart overrules prior Fifth Circuit case law); White v. United States, 53
F.3d 43 (4th Cir. 1995) (using Grubart test); Neely v. Club Med Management Serv-
19971 555
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ring opinion demonstrates, this case will not end the debate on
which test is most appropriate. Indeed, although admiralty law
has contained "nexus" or "location plus" tests for admiralty tort
jurisdiction for a number of years, detractors of the new method
have voiced their opinion continually. But the arguments of
these detractors overcome neither the soundness of the Grubart
decision nor the soundness of the reasons for having a nexus
test for admiralty tort jurisdiction.
Part II of this Note will discuss the development of admi-
ralty tort jurisdiction, particularly in the United States. This
section will highlight the problematic aspects and the criticisms
levied against strict application of the locality test. Part III of
this Note will set forth the facts and decision of the Grubart
case. Part IV of this Note will analyze the Court's decision in
light of the history of admiralty tort jurisdiction. Part V will
conclude that the Court's decision was inevitable and proper,
but not sufficient to stem the criticisms levied by those yearning
for a return to the strict application of the locality test.
II. Background
A. Admiralty Jurisdiction Generally
Jurisdiction is the "power of the court to decide a matter in
controversy... . 3 o But, as with admiralty law, jurisdiction may
also implicate a certain body of law. Thus, depending on the
matter at hand, jurisdiction itself may be the most important
issue for a litigant. For example, in the noted case, Great Lakes
sued to limit its liability to the value of the vessels involved pur-
suant to the Limitation of Vessel Owner's Liability Act.31 Since
the decision in Grubart, the city of Chicago has already settled
seventeen of over sixty-five claims for $36 million3 2 while Great
ices, Inc., 63 F.3d 166, 179 (3d Cir. 1995) (using Grubart test); Tokyo Marine and
Fire Ins. Co. Ltd. v. Perez, 893 F. Supp. 132, 134 (D.P.R. 1995) (citing Grubart for
admiralty tort jurisdiction test); McClenahan v. Paradise Cruises, Ltd., 888 F.
Supp. 120, 123 (D. Haw. 1995) (finding that Grubart overrules factor approach of
prior caselaw).
30. BLAci's LAW DICTIONARY 853 (6th ed. 1991).
31. See Grubart, 115 S. Ct. at 1047.
32. See Mary A. Mitchell, $36 Million Payout Settles Loop Flood Suit Against
City, CHICAGO SuN-TIMES, Aug. 12, 1995, at 3.
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Lakes may be liable for only $633,940-the value of the vessels
involved.33
Admiralty procedure is governed generally by the Federal
Rules of Civil ProcedureM ("FRCP") that also provide supple-
mental rules for certain admiralty procedures. 35 In addition to
the supplemental rules, the FRCP contains special provisions
for admiralty cases. For example, in Rule 38 entitled "Jury
Trial of Right," section (e) states that the rule "shall not be con-
strued to create a right to trial by jury of the issues in an admi-
ralty or maritime claim.... ."36 Admiralty procedure is governed
by other special rules established by both statute and caselaw.3 7
Substantively, admiralty cases are governed by both fed-
eral statutes and federal common law based on the traditional
principles of maritime law.3 8 For example, the Death on the
High Seas Act39 creates a cause of action for death "on the high
seas beyond a marine league from the shore" for the benefit of a
limited group.4° However, the proposition that a vessel and its
owners "are liable, in case a seaman falls sick, or is wounded, in
the service of the ship, to the extent of his maintenance and
cure, and to his wages, at least so long as the voyage contin-
ued[,]" 41 though a settled principle of admiralty law, has no
statutory authority. It is a proposition "of ancient vintage,"4
and appears to derive from some of the early European Codes.4
Getting to this body of procedural and substantive law, like the
33. See Michael Briggs, City Suffers Legal Setback In Battle Over Loop Flood,
CHIcAGo SuN-TimEs, Feb. 23, 1995, at 14.
34. Rule 1 states that the FRCP governs "the procedure in the United States
district courts in all suits of a civil nature whether cognizable as cases at law or in
equity or in admiralty." FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
35. FED. R. Civ. P. Sup. R. A-F.
36. FED. R. CIv. P. 38(e). See FED. R. Civ. P. 14 (governing third party action)
and FED. R. Civ. P. 82 (limiting the rules of venue in admiralty claims).
37. See generally THoMAs J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW,
§ 3-2 (1987).
38. See id.
39. 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-68 (1994).
40. Id. § 761.
41. The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 175 (1902).
42. SCHOENBAUM, supra note 37, § 5-2.
43. See The Osceola, 189 U.S. at 169-72 (investigating ancient sea codes of
Europe to find support for proposition that vessels and owners liable for sickness of
seaman while in service of ship).
1997] 557
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admiralty law itself, is a subject rooted in the history of
commerce.
Maritime law originated in the traditional practices of the
ancient Mediterranean traders." These customs formed the ba-
sis from which the Early European Codes developed. 45 These
Codes "purported not so much to enact law for any territory as
to state what was conceived already to be law by custom of the
sea."46 But the closeness of trade and shipping in the principles
of admiralty law blurred the distinction between trade, which
includes activities having no connection to maritime commerce,
and shipping, resulting in admiralty's "pre-empting" territorial
law.47 In England, the extensive jurisdiction of the admiralty
was systematically limited. In 1389, Parliament limited admi-
ralty jurisdiction to things "done upon the sea."48 The common
law courts narrowly construed this language and limited admi-
ralty jurisdiction nearly to the literal meaning of the words
"done upon the sea."49 By the time of the American Revolution,
admiralty jurisdiction in both England and America was lim-
ited to a "very inconsiderable class of cases."50
The United States Constitution extended federal judicial
power "to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction",51
and Congress gave federal district courts "original jurisdiction"
over admiralty cases. 52 This grant of jurisdiction did not affect
the traditional test for admiralty jurisdiction. In 1813, Justice
Story, then a circuit court judge, stated that "[i]n regard to torts
I have always understood, that the jurisdiction of the admiralty
is exclusively dependent upon the locality of the act."53 In De
Lovio v. Boit,5 4 Justice Story clarified his view by holding that
admiralty tort jurisdiction is limited to "injuries and offences,
44. See GRANT GILMORE & CHARLES L. BLACK JR., THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY, § 1-
3 (1975).
45. These include the Tablets of Amalfi, the Llibre del Consolat de mar of Bar-
celona, the Laws of Wisby and the Rules of Oleron. See id.
46. See id.
47. See id.
48. EDGAR T. FELL, RECENT PROBLEMS IN ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION 13 (1922).
49. GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 44, § 1-4.
50. FELL, supra note 48, at 15.
51. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
52. 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) (1994).
53. Thomas v. Lane, 23 F. Cas. 957, 960 (C.C.D. Me. 1813).
54. 7 F. Cas. 418 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815).
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upon the high sea, and in ports as far as the tide ebbs and
flows."5 5 The United States Supreme Court explicitly adopted
this test in The Philadelphia, Wilmington and Baltimore Rail-
road Co. v. The Philadelphia and Havre de Grace Steam Tow-
Boat Co.56
B. The Locality Test in the United States Until 1972
Soon after its adoption in the United States, the locality
test began to change. The "tidal rule," limiting admiralty juris-
diction to the ebb and flow of the tide,57 was overturned in The
Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh58 and made dependent upon
whether or not the water involved was navigable. 59 The change
in rules was initiated primarily because of a change in circum-
stances. The United States Supreme Court noted that the origi-
nal rule was adopted "when the commerce on the rivers of the
west and on the lakes was in its infancy, and of little impor-
tance, and but little regarded compared with that of present
day."60 Further, because commerce on the lakes and navigable
waters in the West would not be subject to admiralty jurisdic-
tion under the original test, the Court determined that there
would not be equal rights among the states-a basis upon which
the union is formed.61
The location of the injury was also an issue. In The Plym-
outh,62 a vessel anchored near a wharf caught fire due to the
negligence of those in charge of the vessels.63 A suit in admi-
ralty was commenced, but was dismissed by the District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois for lack of jurisdiction. 64 The
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. 65 The argu-
55. Id. at 441. This opinion is one of the classic opinions written on admiralty
jurisdiction. Justice Story gives a detailed account of the history of admiralty ju-
risdiction in reaching his conclusion.
56. 64 U.S. 209, 215 (1859) (holding that admiralty tort jurisdiction "depends
entirely on locality").
57. De Lovio, 7 F. Cas. at 441.
58. 53 U.S. 443 (1851).
59. See id. at 457.
60. Id. at 456.
61. See id. at 454.
62. 70 U.S. 20 (1865).
63. Id.
64. See id.
65. See id.
1997] 559
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ment was made to the Supreme Court that this was a "mixed
case"-the tort being committed partly on land and partly on
water.66 The Court, however, noted that mixed cases subject to
admiralty jurisdiction were those cases brought in contract
where admirality jurisdiction was also dependent on the subject
matter of the contract. 67 Since tort cases have only a "remote
resemblance" to contract cases, the Court refused to analyze
this as a "mixed case."r Another argument made in support of
jurisdiction was that since the vessel which spread the fire to
the wharf was a maritime vessel, the tort was maritime in na-
ture.69 The Court found this argument misdirected, for admi-
ralty tort jurisdiction "does not depend upon the wrong having
been committed on board the vessel, but upon its having been
committed upon the high seas or other navigable waters."70 The
Court held that in order to properly assert admiralty jurisdic-
tion, both the wrong and injury must be upon the high seas or
navigable water.71
Though the Court in The Plymouth, by requiring locality on
navigable water for both the wrong and injury, appeared to set-
tle the question of admiralty tort jurisdiction, it actually gave
rise to the first set of cases foreshadowing the move away from a
strict application of the locality test. In The Blackheath,72 the
Court held that injury to a buoy by a vessel gave rise to admi-
ralty jurisdiction because the buoy was a government aid to
navigation-traditionally within the purview of admiralty
law-and was only technically land through its connection to
the bottom of the river.73 In essence, the Court expanded the
reach of admiralty jurisdiction without corrupting the jurisdic-
tional test by defining the factual setting in such a way that the
test would be satisfied. The Court subsequently found jurisdic-
tion lacking when the injury was to structures dealing with
66. Id. at 34.
67. See id.
68. See The Plymouth, 70 U.S. at 34-35.
69. See id. at 35.
70. Id.
71. See id.
72. 195 U.S. 361 (1904).
73. Id. at 367.
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land based commerce. 74 What is important about these cases is
that the Court looked to the incident to determine if there was a
traditional connection to admiralty law. 75 This concern over
whether the facts have a traditional connection to admiralty
law prompted future changes in admiralty tort jurisdiction. 76
The judiciary, however, did not question the utility of the local-
ity test until it was faced with the inequities and absurdities of
its application.
1. Inequities and Absurdities
In T. Smith & Sons v. Taylor,77 a longshoreman was struck
by a sling and thrown into the water while working on a
wharf.78 The longshoreman's widow brought suit under the
state's workmen's compensation statute and won. 79 The defend-
ant claimed the case was within admiralty, and therefore, appli-
cation of the state law was unconstitutional.80 The Supreme
Court held that because "[tihe substance and consummation of
the occurrence which gave rise to the cause of action took place
on land"-being the place where the longshoreman was
struck-there was no admiralty jurisdiction.8' Seven years
later, the Court held for admiralty jurisdiction in a case with
very similar facts. In Minnie v. Port Huron Terminal,82 a long-
shoreman was struck by a crane and thrown onto a wharf while
working on a vessel.83 In affirming the Louisiana Supreme
Court's holding that federal law applied, the United States
Supreme Court held that the maritime character of the cause of
action was not altered merely because the injured party was
74. See Martin v. West, 222 U.S. 191 (1911) (holding tollbridge a land struc-
ture "used as an aid to commerce on land", and therefore no admiralty jurisdic-
tion); Cleveland Terminal & Valley R.R. Co. v. Cleveland Steamship Co., 208 U.S.
316 (1908) (holding bridge, dock, protective pilings and pier all structures con-
nected to commerce on land, not aids to navigation, and therefore no admiralty
jurisdiction).
75. See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
76. See infra note 108 and accompanying text.
77. 276 U.S. 179 (1928).
78. Id. at 181. The accident resulted in the longshoreman's death. See id.
79. See id. at 180.
80. See id. at 181.
81. Id. at 182.
82. 295 U.S. 647 (1935).
83. Id.
1997] 561
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thrown onto land.8 4 The Court found this result perfectly con-
sistent with the reasoning of T. Smith & Sons v. Taylor:
If, when the blow from a swinging crane knocks a longshoreman
from the dock into the water, the cause of action arises on the
land, it must follow, upon the same reasoning, that when he is
struck upon the vessel and the blow throws him upon the dock the
cause of action arises on the vessel.85
Application of the locality test resulted in different holdings de-
spite the fact that the cases in question had exactly the same
character and almost exactly the same facts.
The Extension of Admiralty Jurisdiction Act 86 ("Extension
Act"), enacted in 1948, was designed to remedy this confusing
line of cases.87 The Extension Act extended admiralty jurisdic-
tion to all cases of injury caused by a vessel,8 "notwithstanding
that such damage or injury be done or consummated on land."8 9
The limitation on admiralty jurisdiction that The Plymouth
holding created was effectively overruled by the Extension Act.
However, the Extension Act did not rectify all the absurd re-
sults of the application of the locality test as set forth by the
court in The Plymouth.
Strict application of the locality test resulted in the exten-
sion of admiralty jurisdiction to cases having almost no connec-
tion with maritime commerce-the object of admiralty law. In
King v. Testerman,90 a water-skier brought an admiralty suit
against the pilot of the boat for operating the boat in a negligent
manner.91 Noting that the incident involved the operation of a
boat on navigable water, the district court felt compelled to find
admiralty jurisdiction.9 2 In Davis v. City of Jacksonville
84. See id. at 648.
85. Minnie, 295 U.S. at 649.
86. 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1994).
87. See Grubart, 115 S. Ct. at 1047-48.
88. The limitation that the injury be caused by a vessel includes damage
"proximately caused by the vessel or its master or crew." THoMAs J. SCHOENBAUM,
ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW, § 3-4, at 71 (1987). The question of when a ship or
its crew proximately causes damage has generated its own confusing line of cases.
See generally id.
89. 46 U.S.C. § 740.
90. 214 F. Supp. 335 (E.D. Tenn. 1963).
91. Id. at 335-36.
92. See id. at 336.
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Beach,93 a bather was injured by a surfboard, and subsequently
sued the surfboard rider.94 The district court held that the case
fell within the admiralty, noting that "any tort whatever, occur-
ring on the high seas or navigable waters, is within the admi-
ralty jurisdiction."95 Other courts, however, refused to strictly
apply the locality test.
2. Movement Away from Locality Alone
Beginning in the 1960s, courts began to apply the locality
test in a less stringent manner. These courts generally noted
that the Supreme Court, in Atlantic Transport Co. v. Im-
brovek,96 refused to hold that the locality test was the sole test
for admiralty jurisdiction. 97 In McGuire v. City of New York,9
the court avoided strict application of the locality test, finding
that the locality test is "a rule of exclusion or limitation . . .99
Thus, locality "is merely a prima facie test of admiralty jurisdic-
tion."100 Noting that admiralty law is tied to commerce, the
court held that admiralty jurisdiction extends to "all matters re-
lating to the business of the sea.... "101 In McGuire, a plaintiff
sued the city for injuries she sustained while swimming.10 2
Since the tort had no connection with the business of the sea,
and because the tort was indistinguishable from an injury sus-
tained on a beach, 0 3 the court refused to extend admiralty ju-
risdiction to the case.10 4
McGuire gave birth to a line of cases which rejected strict
application of the locality test. In Chapman v. City of Grosse
93. 251 F. Supp. 327 (M.D. Fla. 1965).
94. Id. at 328.
95. Id.
96. 234 U.S. 52 (1914).
97. Id. at 61. The Court held that "[e]ven if it be assumed that the require-
ment as to locality in tort cases, while indispensable, is not necessarily exclusive
... the district court, from any point of view, had jurisdiction." Id. at 61 (emphasis
added). The Court, therefore, left room for speculation as to whether or not locality
may operate merely as a threshold showing.
98. 192 F. Supp. 866 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
99. Id. at 869.
100. Id. at 870.
101. Id. at 871.
102. Id. at 866.
103. See McGuire, 192 F. Supp. at 871.
104. See id. at 872.
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Pointe Farms,10 5 the plaintiff was injured when diving into
eighteen inches of water off a pier that was part of recreational
facilities owned by the city. 06 The Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit held that because there was no connection to mar-
itime service, navigation or commerce there was no admiralty
jurisdiction. 0 7 In its decision, the court held that the locality
test should "be used to exclude from admiralty courts those
cases in which the tort giving rise to the lawsuit occurred on
land," but "that jurisdiction may not be based solely on the lo-
cality criterion."08
In O'Connor & Co. v. City of Pascagoula,10 9 the plaintiff, en-
gaged in shipping explosives, alleged that the defendant city il-
legally interfered with its loading explosives aboard ship. 10
The District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, cit-
ing Chapman, held that a "locality plus" test, which required a
showing of a connection to maritime service, navigation or com-
merce, was required to find admiralty jurisdiction."' In Peyta-
vin v. Government Employees Insurance Co.," 2 the plaintiff
allegedly sustained whiplash injuries when another car hit his
while he was parked on a floating pontoon waiting to buy a
ticket for a ferry." 3 After tracking the history of the locality
test,114 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found no admi-
ralty jurisdiction, stating that neither the activity in which the
parties engaged nor the injuries had a substantial connection
with either maritime activities or interests." 5 These cases all
reflect an attempt to develop a test for admiralty tort jurisdic-
tion more closely related to the primary subject of admiralty
law-maritime commerce.
105. 385 F.2d 962 (6th Cir. 1967).
106. Id. at 963.
107. See id. at 966.
108. Id. See also Gowdy v. United States, 412 F.2d 525 (6th Cir. 1969) (dis-
cussing Chapman and need for connection between wrong and maritime activity).
109. 304 F. Supp. 681 (S.D. Miss. 1969).
110. Id. at 682.
111. See id.
112. 453 F.2d 1121 (5th Cir. 1972).
113. Id. at 1122.
114. See id. at 1122-25. The court focused its historical analysis on the "ex-
tension of land" doctrine, citing some of the same cases that are cited in this Note.
See id. at 1125.
115. See id. at 1127.
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These cases also reflect the criticisms and doubts expressed
by commentators as to the value of a strict locality test.116
These concerns refer to the test's reliance on location and not
with the "real and practical relation with the business and com-
merce of the sea."117 The desired link to maritime commerce is
reasonable due to the practical basis for a distinct admiralty
law:
Whether a given inclusion within or exclusion from the jurisdic-
tion is warranted must depend on the general sense and policy of
having the jurisdiction at all. It is hard to think of any better
reason for having this jurisdiction than its aptness for providing a
special-industry court for the maritime industry."18
Further, admiralty law is "not necessarily well suited for gen-
eral non-maritime application,"11 9 and may even have a detri-
mental effect on the just outcome of a matter having little or no
connection to maritime commerce. 20 Indeed, it is hard to dis-
pute such reasoning: why should the test for reaching a special-
ized body of law be so expansive as to encompass cases which
that body of law was not designed to govern?
C. Admiralty Jurisdiction and Aviation
The development of air travel and commerce created diffi-
cult problems for admiralty tort jurisdiction. Air travel and air-
craft did not fit easily into the confines of admiralty tort
jurisdiction. It is not surprising, then, that aviation cases were
the ones in which the Supreme Court took the first steps away
from strict application of the locality test.121
In the earliest cases dealing with aircraft and admiralty ju-
risdiction the courts addressed the question of whether an air-
craft is a maritime vessel. In The Crawford Bros. No. 2 Foss v.
116. See generally Charles L. Black, Admiralty Jurisdiction: Critique and
Suggestions, 50 COL. L. REV. 259 (1950); GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 44; E. BEN-
EDICT, THE LAW OF AMERICAN ADMIRALTY, § 127, at 349-52 (1940); 7A J. MOORE,
FEDERAL PRACTICE, ADMIRALTY .325(3) & (5); David P. Currie, Federalism and the
Admiralty: "The Devil's Own Mess", 1960 S. CT. REV. 158 (1960) (advocating a
more active Supreme Court to formulate more cohesive maritime law).
117. Black, supra note 116, at 264.
118. GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 44, § 1-10, at 30.
119. MOORE, supra note 116, § .325 (5).
120. See id.
121. See infra note 160 and accompanying text.
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The Crawford Bros. No 2,12 the District Court for the Western
District of Washington refused to extend admiralty jurisdiction
to enforce a maritime lien against an airplane. 123 The court
noted that maritime liens can only exist on vessels engaged in
navigation on navigable waters, 24 and held that in the ab-
sence of legislation conferring jurisdiction over this "new" form
of commerce, the issue should be decided by the trial courts. 25
In United States v. Northwest Air Service,126 the Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit needed to determine the priority of
liens on a seaplane.127 The United States filed an in rem action
against a seaplane to recover penalties for the owner's violation
of federal laws.' 2- The plane was seized while in a hangar on
shore. 29 Northwest Air Service ("Northwest") intervened,
claiming a lien for making repairs on the seaplane, the engine
of which was still in Northwest's custody.130 Northwest main-
tained that the seaplane was a vessel within maritime jurisdic-
tion, and therefore that its lien was superior.' 3' The court held
that while a seaplane afloat on navigable water may be a vessel
within admiralty, it does not retain such status while on land,
in a hangar undergoing repairs and without an engine. 32
However, in Reinhardt v. Newport Flying Service Corp.,133
Justice Cardozo, then a Judge on the Court of Appeals of New
York, found that aircraft were subject to admiralty jurisdiction
while afloat. 34 Cardozo first noted that the term "vessel" was
interpreted broadly and included rafts, scows, dredges, tempo-
rarily sunken drillboats and "anything upon the water where
122. 215 F. 269 (W.D. Wash. 1914).
123. Id. at 271.
124. See id.
125. See id.
126. 80 F.2d 804 (9th Cir. 1935).
127. Id. at 805.
128. See id. at 804.
129. See id.
130. See id.
131. See id. at 805.
132. See id. at 805. See also Dollins v. Pan-American Grace Airways, Inc., 27
F. Supp. 487 (S.D.N.Y. 1939) (holding airship not vessel within liability limiting
statutes); Noakes v. Imperial Airways, Ltd., 29 F. Supp. 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1939) (hold-
ing airship not vessel within liability limiting statutes).
133. 232 N.Y. 115, 133 N.E. 371 (1921).
134. Id. at 119, 133 N.E. at 372.
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movement is predominant rather than fixity or permanence." 135
Next, he declared that seaplanes have a primary function of
traveling through air and an auxiliary function of traveling in
water. 36 While on the water, the plane is subject to admiralty
jurisdiction. 3 7 Cardozo defended this bifurcation:
It is no reason for the exclusion of jurisdiction when the mischief
is traceable to the function that is auxiliary and secondary. Colli-
sion does not cease to be collision and a peril of the sea because
the structure is amphibious. We cannot even say that the chance
that the peril will be encountered is so remote as to be negligible.
The records of the Navy Department show that there have been
times, in transatlantic flights, when planes, abandoning the air,
moved for days upon the water. 38
Also giving rise to the question of whether admiralty law
should apply were the crashes of airplanes into water. Many
cases held that the Death on the High Seas Act 39 conferred ad-
miralty jurisdiction over suits commenced due to plane crashes
in navigable waters. 40 However, in cases where the Death on
135. Id. at 118, 133 N.E. at 372.
136. See id.
137. See id.
138. Reinhardt, 232 N.Y. at 118-19, 133 N.E. at 372. This bifurcated view of
seaplanes is still used, even after the test for admiralty jurisdiction changed, to
require some connection to traditional maritime activity as well as maritime local-
ity. In Hark v. Antilles Airboats, Inc., 355 F. Supp. 683 (D.V.I. 1973), a passenger
on a seaplane claimed injury when the seaplane ditched in a harbor shortly after
takeoff due to engine trouble. Id. at 684. The District Court for the District of the
Virgin Islands, citing Reinhardt, noted that when floating, a seaplane is subject to
admiralty jurisdiction because it is a vessel. See id. at 685. This case, however,
was problematic, for the plane had not yet completed takeoff, though it was two
hundred feet above the sea when it had engine trouble. See id. The court ulti-
mately held that this incident was subject to admiralty jurisdiction. See id. at 686.
The court noted that the concerns faced when taking off and landing seaplanes are
"marine" in nature, unlike the concerns faced by their conventional counterparts,
because the flight was over international waters and "it seems desirable to treat
ship and aircraft accidents in the same manner, insofar as possible." Id. at 686.
See Hubschman v. Antilles Airboats, Inc., 440 F. Supp. 828, 841 (D.V.I. 1977)
(holding admiralty jurisdiction attaches where injury was sustained either while
in seaplane on water or while outside seaplane in water).
139. 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-68 (1994).
140. See Trihey v. Transocean Air Lines, 255 F.2d 824 (9th Cir. 1958) (noting
Death on the High Seas Act grants exclusive jurisdiction to admiralty); Higa v.
Transocean Airlines, 230 F.2d 780 (9th Cir. 1955) (limiting jurisdiction under
Death on the High Seas Act to admiralty).
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the High Seas Act does not apply, 141 admiralty jurisdiction must
have some independent justification if it is to be found. In
Weinstein v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.,142 a plane crashed into the
navigable waters of Boston Harbor shortly after taking off.143
The court held that even if admiralty tort jurisdiction required
some maritime nexus in addition to the locality test, the matter
fell within admiralty jurisdiction. 1 In so holding, the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit noted that maritime law should
not remain static and that "[w]hen an aircraft crashes into navi-
gable waters, the dangers to persons and property are much the
same as those arising out of the sinking of a ship or a collision
between two vessels." 45 Similar cases followed. 46 Courts have
even held that injuries sustained in an aircraft due to turbu-
lence are subject to admiralty jurisdiction. 47
D. 1972 Turning Point: The Plane Crash that Changed
Admiralty Tort Jurisdiction
The United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of
plane crashes in navigable water in Executive Jet Aviation v.
City of Cleveland. 48 On July 28, 1968, a jet struck a flock of
seagulls over a runway while taking off and crashed in the navi-
gable waters of Lake Erie. 49 The district court dismissed the
petitioner's admiralty claim. 50 The Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit affirmed, referring to a locality test that required
a relationship between the wrong and some maritime activ-
ity.' 5 ' The court of appeals did not reach the "connection" or
141. See 46 U.S.C. § 761. Crashes within one marine mile of shore. Id.
142. 316 F.2d 758 (3d Cir. 1963).
143. Id. at 760. The plane was not a seaplane. See id.
144. See id. at 763.
145. Id.
146. See Hornsby v. Fish Meal Co., 431 F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 1970) (upholding
admiralty jurisdiction where planes engaged in spotting fish collided and crashed
within one marine mile of shore); Horton v. J. & J. Aircraft, Inc., 257 F. Supp. 120
(S.D. Fla. 1966) (finding admiralty jurisdiction for plane crash in Atlantic ocean
using locality test).
147. See Notarian v. Trans World Airlines Inc., 244 F. Supp. 874 (W.D. Pa.
1965).
148. 409 U.S. 249 (1972).
149. See id. at 250.
150. See id.
151. See Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 448 F.2d 151, 154
(6th Cir. 1971).
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"nexus" aspect of the test because it found that the tort occurred
over land.152
After reciting the history of admiralty tort jurisdiction, the
Supreme Court determined that strictly applying the locality
test when dealing with aviation cases that may implicate admi-
ralty law is inherently ineffective. 153 The Court stated that over
the years there had developed a recognition that "reliance on
the relationship of the wrong to traditional maritime activity is
often more sensible and more consonant with the purposes of
maritime law than is a purely mechanical application of the lo-
cality test."154
The petitioner argued that because its plane crashed in
navigable water, the navigable water was the locality of the
tort. 155 The respondent, on the other hand, argued that because
the plane collided with the birds over land, the land was the
locality of the tort.156 The Court found the entire approach
troublesome. The Court demonstrated the problem by examin-
ing a hypothetical situation in which two planes collide and one
crashes on the land and the other crashes in a navigable
river. 157 In considering either parties' viewpoint, the Court
found the application of admiralty jurisdiction in this hypotheti-
cal completely "fortuitous." 58 The Court attributed these
problems to the nature of aircraft which "are not restrained by
[the] one-dimensional geographic and physical boundaries"15 9
that restrain water vessels. The Court concluded:
It is far more consistent with the history and purpose of admiralty
to require also that the wrong bear a significant relationship to
traditional maritime activity. We hold that unless such a rela-
tionship exists, claims arising from airplane accidents are not cog-
nizable in admiralty in the absence of legislation to the
contrary. 16o
152. See id. The court noted its discussion of the "connection" or "nexus" be-
tween the wrong and traditional maritime activity in Chapman and Gowdy. Id.
153. See Executive Jet, 409 U.S. at 267.
154. Id. at 261.
155. See id. at 266-67.
156. See id. at 267.
157. See id.
158. See Executive Jet, 409 U.S. at 267.
159. Id. at 268.
160. Id. (emphasis added).
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Noting that admiralty law deals particularly with the
movement of vessels upon the water,161 and that the rules of
admiralty are neither legally nor systematically applicable to
aircraft, 162 the Court determined that there is no significant re-
lationship between a land based plane flying from one point to
another in the continental United States and traditional mari-
time activity.163 Though it precluded a large number of cases
from admiralty jurisdiction, the Court suggested that where an
aircraft performs a function traditionally within the purview of
water vessels, it might bear the requisite relationship to mari-
time activity needed to pass the jurisdictional test.164 Thus, Ex-
ecutive Jet reflects the same concern for the purposes of
admiralty jurisdiction as do the McGuire line of cases. 1685
After Executive Jet, courts were faced with the question of
whether the Supreme Court had actually endorsed a modifica-
tion of the locality test for all cases involving admiralty jurisdic-
tion. Almost uniformly, these cases held that Executive Jet
derogated strict adherence to the locality test for admiralty tort
cases.166 The initial cases in the district courts used Executive
Jet as evidence of doubt in the validity of the locality test.167 In
Kelly v. J. C. Smith,168 the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit held that "maritime locality alone is no longer sufficient
to sustain maritime jurisdiction, and that the wrong must bear
a significant relationship to maritime activity."16 9 The court
161. See id. at 269-70.
162. See id. at 270.
163. See Executive Jet, 409 U.S. at 270.
164. See id. at 271. The Court drew attention to Hornsby, supra at note 146,
where admiralty jurisdiction was held in a case involving planes used to spot
schools of fish. See id.
165. See supra notes 98-115 and accompanying text.
166. See Adams v. Montana Power Co., 354 F. Supp. 111 (D. Mont. 1973)
(holding Executive Jet "diminished the binding force" of locality test); Luna v. Star
of India, 356 F. Supp. 59 (S.D. Cal. 1973) (finding Executive Jet rationale that mar-
itime relationship test more sensible and consonant with purposes of maritime law
correct); Rubin v. Power Auth. of State of N.Y., 356 F. Supp. 1169 (W.D.N.Y. 1973)
(using comments in Executive Jet leads to application of maritime nexus test in
case where divers were drawn into water intakes of generating plant); but see
Maryland v. Amerada Hess Corp., 356 F. Supp. 975 (D. Md. 1973) (holding plain
reading of Executive Jet decision does not imply extension beyond airplane cases).
167. See id.
168. 485 F.2d 520 (5th Cir. 1973).
169. Id. at 524 (footnote omitted).
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cited dicta in Executive Jet indicating that a strict, mechanical
application of the locality test did not suit the purposes of mari-
time law as effectively as a nexus test.170 The court also cited
prior Fifth Circuit cases which used a nexus test 171 as authority
for its holding.172
In Kelly, the plaintiffs were suspected of poaching on an is-
land where exclusive hunting rights had been granted to a pri-
vate organization. 173 They were seen leaving the island by boat
and were fired upon from land after refusing to stop. 174 Nearly
six years after the incident, the plaintiffs sued for their injuries
and won.175 A critical holding at trial was that the suit was in
admiralty and not barred by laches. 176 After determining that
the locality test was no longer appropriate,'177 the court distilled,
from the analysis in both Executive Jet and Peytavin, four fac-
tors to use in determining the extent of the relationship be-
tween the wrong and maritime activity.178 The factors are: "the
functions and roles of the parties; the types of vehicles and in-
strumentalities involved; the causation and the type of injury;
and traditional concepts of the role of admiralty law."179 Subse-
170. Id. The court cited the following language from Executive Jet:
* .. there has existed over the years a judicial, legislative, and scholarly
recognition that, in determining whether there is admiralty jurisdiction
over a particular tort or class of torts, reliance on the relationship of the
wrong to traditional maritime activity is often more consonant with the pur-
poses of maritime law than is a purely mechanical application of the locality
test.
Executive Jet, 409 U.S. at 261.
171. See id. at 524, citing Peytavin v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 453
F.2d 1121 (5th Cir. 1972) (holding each incident must have substantial connection
with maritime activity for jurisdiction); Watz v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 431 F.2d
100 (5th Cir. 1970) (finding jurisdiction test not certain and nexus test reasonable).
172. See Kelly, 485 F.2d at 523-24.
173. Id. at 521-22.
174. See id. at 522.
175. See id.
176. See id. at 523. Laches "is defined as neglect to assert a right or claim
which taken together with lapse of time and other circumstances causing prejudice
to adverse party, operates as bar in court of equity." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 875
(6th ed. 1990).
177. See Kelly, 485 F.2d at 524.
178. See id. at 525.
179. Id. at 525. The court held that since the party most seriously injured was
the pilot, the vehicle involved was a boat, and because "admiralty has traditionally
been concerned with furnishing remedies for those injured while traveling naviga-
ble waters," admiralty jurisdiction was appropriate. Id. at 526.
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quent cases also found that after Executive Jet, locality alone
was no longer sufficient to find admiralty jurisdiction. 180
E. Supreme Court Refinements of the Admiralty Jurisdiction
Test
The United States Supreme Court again faced the admi-
ralty jurisdiction issue in 1982. In Foremost Insurance Co. v.
Richardson,i 18 the Court considered whether there was admi-
ralty jurisdiction when two pleasure boats collided on navigable
water. 8 2 The Court granted certiorari "to resolve the confusion
in the lower courts respecting the impact of Executive Jet ... on
traditional rules for determining federal admiralty jurisdic-
tion."8 3 Specifically, the Court set out to determine if the Exec-
utive Jet rejection of the strict application of the locality test
extended beyond the aviation context.l& Noting that Executive
Jet observed criticism of the locality test,18 5 and the underlying
rational of that ruling, the Court held that "the Executive Jet
requirement that the wrong have a significant connection with
180. See Kelly v. United States, 531 F.2d 1144 (2d Cir. 1976) (holding that
after Executive Jet, suits involving pleasure craft precluded from admiralty juris-
diction only if alleged wrong does not bear significant relationship to traditional
maritime activity); St. Hilaire Moye v. Henderson, 496 F.2d 973 (8th Cir. 1974)
(sustaining admiralty jurisdiction in case involving pleasure boat); Oppen v. Aetna
Insurance Co., 485 F.2d 252 (9th Cir. 1973) (finding admiralty jurisdiction in case
involving infringement of navigation right). Of particular interest are two aviation
cases. In Roberts v. United States, 498 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1974), the court held that
the crash of a cargo plane engaged in transporting cargo from Los Angeles to Viet
Nam near Okinawa was not a matter precluded from admiralty by Executive Jet.
Id. at 524. The court reasoned that geographic realities made the plane's contact
with navigable water more than merely fortuitous and that transocean transporta-
tion by plane is analogous to a traditional maritime activity. Id. at 524. In Fal-
gout Boats Inc. v. United States, 508 F.2d 855 (9th Cir. 1974), the court held that
when a sidewinder missile, fired from a U.S. Navy airplane, struck a ship in navi-
gable water, there was admiralty jurisdiction. Id. at 856. The court found that
because the launching of a missile over navigable waters created a potential haz-
ard to maritime navigation and because Navy aviation is an integral part of the
naval service, "it cannot be said that the naval plane's activity over water in the
instant case was entirely 'fortuitous' as was the plane involved in Executive Jet."
Id. at 857.
181. 457 U.S. 668 (1982).
182. Id. at 669.
183. Id.
184. See id. at 672.
185. See id. at 673.
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traditional maritime activity is not limited to the aviation
context." 18 6
The petitioner argued that this new test required a sub-
stantial relationship to commercial maritime activity "because
commercial shipping is at the heart of the traditional maritime
activity sought to be protected by giving the federal courts ex-
clusive jurisdiction over all admiralty suits."18 7 The Court, how-
ever, noted that noncommercial maritime activity can affect
commercial maritime conduct and that admiralty law has tradi-
tionally been concerned with navigation.'88 The Court further
determined that a distinction between commercial and noncom-
mercial activity would interject uncertainty into the jurisdic-
tional test.189 Four dissenters, however, argued that because
the vessels involved were only pleasure craft, never used in any
commercial activity, there was "no connection with any historic
federal admiralty interest."190
Ultimately, the Court held that the claims arising from the
collision of two pleasure boats in navigable waters were subject
to admiralty tort jurisdiction. 19 The Court relied on three basic
principles to reach its holding: "the need for uniform rules gov-
erning navigation, the potential impact on maritime commerce
when two vessels collide on navigable waters, and the uncer-
tainty and confusion" that would result from a jurisdictional
test tied to the use of a given boat. 9 2 The Court found that
there was a potential disruptive impact on navigation, a partic-
ular concern of maritime law, when two boats collide on naviga-
ble water. 9 3  Unlike Executive Jet, the Court found that the
potential hazard to maritime commerce in this case "arises out
of activity that bears a substantial relationship to traditional
maritime activity."194
186. Foremost, 457 U.S. at 674.
187. Id.
188. See id. at 675.
189. See id. at 676.
190. Id. at 680 (Powell, J., dissenting) (Chief Justice Burger, Justice Rehn-
quist, and Justice O'Connor joined in the dissent).
191. See Foremost, 457 U.S. at 677.
192. See id.
193. See id. at 675.
194. See id. n.5.
57319971
21
PACE LAW REVIEW
These principles, extracted from the holding in Executive
Jet, were consolidated into a definite test in Sisson v. Ruby. 195
In Sisson, a fire started on a boat, the Ultorian, while it was
docked at a marina. 196 The fire, which started in the vessel's
washer/dryer unit, destroyed the Ultorian and damaged the
marina and other vessels.197 The owner of the Ultorian wanted
to limit his liability, under the Limited Liability Act,198 to the
value of the salvage of his ship, a mere $800 against claims of
over $275,000 brought against him.199 The District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois dismissed Sisson's action and
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed.200
In reversing the lower court and finding admiralty jurisdic-
tion,201 the Court applied a three part test extracted from the
amorphous holding in Foremost.20 2 First, the facts must satisfy
the traditional location test.20 3 Second, the Court must assess
"the general features of the type of incident involved to deter-
mine whether such an incident is likely to disrupt commercial
activity."20 4 Finally, there must be "a substantial relationship
between the activity giving rise to the incident and traditional
maritime activity."20 5 Again, the assessment is of the general
character of the activity.20 6 The last two steps together make
the "nexus" test.20 7
195. 497 U.S. 358 (1990).
196. Id. at 360.
197. See id.
198. See id. The owner invoked 46 U.S.C. § 183(a), which limits the liability
of an owner of a vessel to the value of the vessel and freight. 46 U.S.C. § 183(a)
(1994).
199. See Sisson, 497 U.S. at 360.
200. See id.
201. See id. at 362-63.
202. See supra notes 191-93 and accompanying text.
203. See Sisson, 497 U.S. at 362. This part of the test was met for the marina
was located on a navigable waterway. See id.
204. Id. at 363.
205. Id. at 364.
206. See id.
207. Commentators and courts use either the phrase "locality plus", "nexus"
or "connection" when referring to this new jurisdictional test. See Philip A. Berns,
Regression of Maritime Jurisdiction in Tort Actions, 3 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 159 (1990/
1991); Phyllis D. Carnilla & Michael P. Drzal, Foremost Insurance Co. v. Richard-
son: If This is Water, It Must Be Admiralty, 59 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1983); John 0.
Pieksen, Jr., Much Ado About Nothing, Or Step-By-Step Determinations of Admi-
ralty Tort Jurisdiction: Sisson v. Ruby, 15 TUL. MAR. L.J. 439 (1991); Jeffrey L.
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The Court found the first part of the nexus test easily satis-
fied.20 First, the Court characterized the incident by its gen-
eral features.20 9 In so doing, the Court ignored such particulars
as the source of the fire or the exact location of the boat at the
marina.210 The incident was thus characterized as "a fire on a
vessel docked at a marina in navigable waters."211 This charac-
terization led the Court to conclude that the incident had the
potential to disrupt commercial maritime activity. 212 The Court
justified its general characterization of the incident to deter-
mine its potential impact by noting that this approach was
taken by the Court in both Foremost and Executive Jet.21 3
For the second part of the nexus test, the Court character-
ized the activity as "the storage and maintenance of a vessel at
a marina on navigable waters."21 4 As with the first part of the
nexus test, the Court found that the incident, so characterized,
easily satisfied the test.215 Again, the Court justified its general
characterization of the activities. 216 This time, the Court rea-
soned that a more particular examination would require courts
to determine, to some extent, "the merits of the causation issue
to answer the ... jurisdictional question."21 7
In making its decision, the Court restricted its holding in a
very particular way. The Court noted that this case, like Execu-
tive Jet and Foremost, involved instrumentalities engaged in
similar activities.218 The Court refused to speculate as to how it
Raizner, Missing the Boat - Another Failed Attempt to Define Admiralty Tort Juris-
diction: Sisson v. Ruby, 29 Hous. L. REv. 733 (1992); Monica A. Beckford &
Michael Sanner, Note, Delta County Ventures: Limiting Admiralty Jurisdiction, 6
U.S.F. MAR. L. J. 245 (1993); Lawrence R. De Buys IV, Note, Resetting the Execu-
tive Jet Compass Again- Smith v. Pan Air Corp., 8 MAR. L. 186 (1983); Albert Lin,
Comment, Jurisdictional Splashdown: Should Aviation Torts Find Solace in Ad-
miralty?, 60 J. Am. L. & COM. 409 (1994).
208. See Sisson, 497 U.S. at 362.
209. See id. at 363.
210. See id.
211. Id.
212. See id.
213. See Sisson, 497 U.S. at 363-64. See also supra notes 160, 191-93 and
accompanying text.
214. Sisson, 497 U.S. at 365.
215. See id. at 367.
216. See id. at 365.
217. Id.
218. See id. n.3.
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would decide a case where the instrumentalities involved were
not engaged in similar activities.219 The Court's decision had
almost no effect on the lower courts.
Following the decision in Foremost, the lower courts contin-
ued to struggle with defining a test to determine whether or not
a given activity is substantially related to maritime commerce.
Though many followed the Fifth Circuit's four factor approach
in Kelly,220 others did not use factors 221 and others were still un-
clear as to which factors to use, including the Fifth Circuit.222
The Court refused to adopt any of the various circuit tests and
found that "at least in cases in which all of the relevant entities
are engaged in similar types of activity, the formula initially
suggested by Executive Jet and more fully refined in Foremost
and in this case provides appropriate and sufficient guidance to
the federal courts."223
Following Sisson, the circuit courts continued to apply the
tests that had developed since Executive Jet. In Broughton Off-
shore Drilling Inc. v. South Central Machine,224 the Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit held that because the Sisson Court
neither approved nor disapproved of the Kelly approach, it
would continue to apply the Kelly factors where appropriate un-
til the Supreme Court provided "further guidance."225 In Price
v. Price,226 the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found
219. See id.
220. See Lewis Charters Inc. v. Huckins Yacht Corp., 871 F.2d 1046 (11th Cir.
1989) (citing Kelly factors as relevant factors for nexus aspect of jurisdictional
test); Eagle-Picher Indus. Inc. v. United States, 937 F.2d 625 (3d Cir. 1988) (noting
broad consensus throughout circuits in use of four factors); Guidry v. Durchin, 834
F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1987) (using four factors to determine whether "significant re-
lationship to traditional maritime activity exists"); Drake v. Raymark Indus. Inc.,
772 F.2d 1007 (1st Cir. 1985) (citing Kelly factors as generally accepted standard).
221. See Keene Corp. v. United States, 700 F.2d 836 (2d Cir. 1983) (looking
only to facts of case and not predetermined factors).
222. Compare Molet v. Penrod Drilling Co., 826 F.2d 1419 (5th Cir. 1987) (ad-
ding impact of event on maritime commerce, desirability of national rule and need
for expertise in trial and decision to Kelly factors) with Molet v. Penrod Drilling
Co., 872 F.2d 1221 (5th Cir. 1989) (applying only four Kelly factors). Compare
Oman v. Johns-Manville Corp., 764 F.2d 224 (4th Cir. 1985) (requiring thorough
analysis of at least Kelly factors) with Bubla v. Bradshaw, 795 F.2d 349 (4th Cir.
1985) (applying only Kelly factors).
223. Sisson, 497 U.S. at 366, n.4 (emphasis added).
224. 911 F.2d 1050 (5th Cir. 1990).
225. Id. at 1052, n.1.
226. 929 F.2d 131 (4th Cir. 1991).
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that a factor approach was still acceptable as long as the court
characterized the activity at the appropriate level of general-
ity.227 In Soniform v. Soniform,228 the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit, noting that the Court in Sisson did not provide
"explicit guidance for determining whether an activity is sub-
stantially related to traditional maritime pursuits," used the
Kelly factors to decide the issue.229 In Sea Vessel, Inc. v.
Reyes,230 the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that
using the Kelly factors was "permissive" after Sisson.231
Thus, after Sisson, each circuit was free to adopt whichever
test it found most appropriate. Though commentators varied in
their assessment, most found the Sisson test ambiguous both in
its application and in its possible effect on lower courts.23 2
Those who advocate a return to the locality test echo the criti-
cisms levied by Justice Scalia's concurring opinion in Sisson.2 a3
Justice Scalia, concerned with judicial economy,2 4 advocated
either a return to the simple locality test or a modification of the
test in Foremost in order to simplify its application.235 In
Grubart v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., the Supreme Court
again addressed the issue of admiralty tort jurisdiction.
III. The Case: Grubart v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock
Company
Pursuant to a contract with the City of Chicago, Great
Lakes replaced certain pilings around the piers of several
bridges over the Chicago River.? 6 Allegedly, this activity
227. Id. at 135.
228. 935 F.2d 599 (3d Cir. 1991).
229. Id. at 602.
230. 23 F.3d 345 (11th Cir. 1994).
231. Id. at 350, n.9.
232. See Berns, supra note 206, at 159 (noting limited and uncertain effect of
Sisson on future applications of test for admiralty jurisdiction); Warren J.
Marwedel & Shari L. Friedman, Admiralty Jurisdiction and the Great Lakes, 24 U.
TOL. L. REV. 345 (1992-1993) (noting ambiguity of Sisson test); Piekson, supra note
206, at 439 (criticizing uncertainty of Sisson test and advocating return to locality
test or uniform rules); Raizner, supra note 206, at 733 (describing Sisson test as
creating expansive inquiry).
233. Sisson, 497 U.S. at 368.
234. See id. at 374 (concurring opinion).
235. See id.
236. See Grubart, 115 S. Ct. at 1046.
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caused the weakening of an old underground freight tunnel.23 7
Seven months after the work was completed, water rushed into
the tunnel and flooded the downtown area of Chicago.238 Flood
victims brought suit against both the city and Great Lakes in
state court.23 9 In an attempt to limit its liability via the Limita-
tion of Vessels Owner's Liability Act, 240 Great Lakes brought
suit in federal court.241 The city and one of the state-court
plaintiffs, Jerome Grubart, Inc., filed a motion to dismiss for
lack of admiralty jurisdiction. 242 The district court granted the
motion,243 but the Seventh Circuit reversed. 244 On appeal, the
issue was deceptively simple: "whether or not a federal admi-
ralty court has jurisdiction over claims that Great Lakes' faulty
replacement work caused the flood damage."245
After a brief exposition of the history of admiralty tort ju-
risdiction, 24 Justice Souter, writing for the majority, 247 reached
the issue of which test applied. The Court found the Sisson test
applicable: "After Sisson,... a party seeking to invoke federal
admiralty jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) over a
tort claim must satisfy conditions both of location and of connec-
tion with maritime activity."248 The Court then outlined the two
parts of the "connection" test with language quoted from Sis-
son.249 First a court must assess the general features of the in-
cident to determine whether the incident has the potential to
disrupt maritime commerce. 250 Then it must assess the general
features of the activity giving rise to the incident to determine
237. See id. at 1047.
238. See id. at 1046-47.
239. See id. at 1047.
240. 46 U.S.C. § 181.
241. See Grubart, 115 S. Ct. at 1047.
242. See id.
243. See id.
244. See Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. City of Chicago, 3 F.3d 225, 232
(7th Cir. 1993).
245. Grubart, 115 S. Ct. at 1047.
246. See id. at 1047-48.
247. The Chief Justice, Justice Kennedy and Justice Ginsburg joined in the
majority opinion while Justices O'Connor and Thomas wrote separate concurring
opinions. Justice Scalia joined Justice Thomas' concurrence while Justices Breyer
and Stevens took no part in the decision.
248. Grubart, 115 S. Ct. at 1048.
249. See id.
250. See id.
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whether there is a substantial relationship between the activity
and traditional maritime activity.251
The Court found that the location test was "readily satis-
fied." 252 If Great Lakes committed a tort, it could only have
done so while replacing the pilings-while it was on navigable
water.253 Further, the Court easily determined, and the parties
did not "seriously dispute," that the barge involved was a ves-
sel.2 54 The only contention brought by the petitioners in regard
to the Extension Act 255 was that the Act should not be read to
encompass every case no matter how distant the harm from the
activity.256 The petitioners claimed that the proximate cause in-
ferred into the Extension Act as a jurisdiction-limiting principle
requires an investigation into the merits of a case to make a
jurisdictional determination. 257 The Court remarked, however,
that this argument "assumes that the truth of jurisdictional al-
legations must always be determined with finality at the
threshold of litigation, but that assumption is erroneous."258
The Court next turned to the connection test.259 Before ap-
plying the test the Court noted that the "test turns ... on a
description of the incident at an intermediate level of possible
generality."260 Rather than modifying the test determined in
Sisson, the Court seemed to be attempting to clarify this notion
of "generality." In this regard, the Court shunned the extreme
possibilities of characterization. 261 The Court generalized the
incident as "damage by a vessel in navigable water to an under-
water structure."262 Because the river traffic was stopped dur-
ing the repairs of the bridge, the determination of whether the
incident had the potential to impact maritime commerce was
simple.263
251. See id.
252. Id. at 1049.
253. See id.
254. Grubart, 115 S. Ct. at 1049.
255. 46 U.S.C. § 740.
256. See Grubart, 115 S. Ct. at 1049.
257. See id. at 1050.
258. See id.
259. See id.
260. Id. at 1051.
261. See Grubart, 115 S. Ct. at 1051.
262. Id.
263. See id.
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The second part of the "connection" test was applied in a
like manner. The Court first characterized the activity as "re-
pair or maintenance work on a navigable waterway performed
from a vessel."264 So described, the Court found that there was
"no question" that the requisite connection existed between the
activity and traditional maritime activity. 265
The petitioners made numerous arguments to attack this
application. First, the city argued that the proper application of
this part of the test required consideration of the city's alleged
negligence. 266 The Court, however, cited expansive language in
Foremost, and concluded that as long as the test is met by at
least one alleged tortfeasor, this part of the nexus test is met.267
Further, the Court noted that Sisson did not consider the activi-
ties of other tortfeasors.268 Second, the petitioners argued that
the activity can be generalized to such a degree that there is no
connection to maritime activity. 269 In addressing this argu-
ment, the Court attempted to clarify "generality" in this part of
the test: "The test turns on the comparison of traditional mari-
time activity to the arguably maritime character of the
tortfeasor's activity in a given case; the comparison would
merely be frustrated by eliminating the maritime aspect of the
tortfeasor's activity from consideration."270
Next, Grubart claimed that this Court's application of the
Sisson test was so expansive as to necessarily include all cases
involving a vessel on navigable waters.271 However,
264. See id.
265. See id.
266. See id. at 1052.
267. See id. The Court quoted Foremost: "because the 'wrong' here involves
the negligent operation of a vessel on navigable waters, we believe that it has a
sufficient nexus to traditional maritime activity to sustain admiralty jurisdiction."
Foremost, 457 U.S. at 674. The Court found that:
[b]y using the word "involves," we made it clear that we need to look only to
whether one of the arguably proximate causes of the incident originated in
the maritime activity of a tortfeasor: as long as one of the putative
tortfeasors was engaged in traditional maritime activity the allegedly
wrongful activity will "involve" such traditional maritime activity and will
meet the second nexus prong.
Grubart, 115 S. Ct. at 1052.
268. See id.
269. See id.
270. Grubart, 115 S. Ct. at 1052 (emphasis added).
271. See id.
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[t]his Court has not proposed any radical alteration of the tradi-
tional criteria for invoking admiralty jurisdiction in tort cases, but
has simply followed the lead of the lower federal courts in re-
jecting a location rule so rigid as to extend admiralty to a case
involving an airplane, not a vessel, engage in an activity far re-
moved from anything traditionally maritime. 272
Therefore, the expansiveness of the rule does not mean that all
such cases will fall within the admiralty, rather, they will only
ordinarily fall within the admiralty. 273
The final claim made by the petitioners was that a factor
test was more appropriate for this situation.274 The petitioners
made this argument in light of the door left open by Sisson.275
They pointed out that Sisson only disapproved of the "factor
test" approach where all the relevant activities engaged in were
similar.276 They argued that a factor test would improve on the
Sisson holding because it would further limit the scope of admi-
ralty jurisdiction, thus avoiding the application of federal admi-
ralty law at the expense of state law when the purposes of
admiralty do not so require.2 77
The Court found this argument unpersuasive. The Court
was not clear, in light of the Extension Act, on "why the need for
admiralty jurisdiction in aid of maritime commerce somehow
becomes less acute merely because land-based parties happen
to be involved."278 Since the Extension Act extended admiralty
jurisdiction to cases involving land-based parties, the Court
could not discern any preference in admiralty jurisdiction for
non-land based parties.279 Therefore, application of a stricter
test for admiralty jurisdiction would be without justification. 280
Next, the court addressed the petitioners' concern with the
preemption of state law. The Court found the concern specious,
for admiralty courts sometimes employ state law.221 Therefore,
272. Id. at 1052-53.
273. See id. at 1053.
274. See id.
275. See id.
276. See Grubart, 115 S. Ct. at 1053.
277. See id.
278. Id. at 1054.
279. See id.
280. See id.
281. See Grubart, 115 S. Ct. at 1054.
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the Court reasoned, the concern is unfounded and ignores "a
fundamental feature of admiralty law, that federal admiralty
courts sometimes do apply state law."28 2
Further, the Court noted that the modifications of the local-
ity test do not destroy the underlying principle of locality in ad-
miralty tort jurisdiction. 283 The Court noted that it reflects
customary practice in seeing jurisdiction as the norm, when the
tort originates with a vessel in navigable waters, and in treat-
ing departure from the locality principle as the exception.284
This "approximate shape" of admiralty jurisdiction, the Court
found, would be violated by a factor test which invites complex-
ity in application and extensive litigation.28 5 For these reasons,
the majority applied the Sisson test 2 86 and found the matter
subject to admiralty jurisdiction. 28 7
The concurring opinion of Justice Thomas, with whom Jus-
tice Scalia joined,28 noted problems with the test developed by
the Supreme Court over the past few years, and proposed a re-
turn to the strict application of the locality test. The primary
reason for a return to this strict test is the preservation of the
resources of both the litigants and the judges involved.28 9
Justice Thomas began by noting that the cases following
Executive Jet failed to respect its self-imposed limitation to
cases involving aircraft. 290 The resulting Foremost-Sisson test
created judicial confusion due to the amorphous quality of what
an "incident" or "activity" is.291 The majority's attempt to clarify
the test did not impress Justice Thomas:
282. Id. See Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354
(1959) (finding state law, though often preempted, still has "wide scope" in admi-
ralty cases).
283. See Grubart, 115 S. Ct. at 1055.
284. See id.
285. See id.
286. See id. at 1050-51.
287. See id. at 1055.
288. See id. at 1055-56 (Thomas, J., concurring). The concurring opinion of
Justice O'Connor notes that the Court's decision should not be read to automati-
cally extend admiralty tort jurisdiction to all claims and parties involved when
admiralty jurisdiction is found to extend to one of the claims. See id.
289. See id. at 1056.
290. See id.
291. See id. at 1057.
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The majority does not explain the origins of "levels of generality,"
nor, to my knowledge, do we employ such a concept in other areas
of jurisdiction .... Nor does the majority explain why an "inter-
mediate" level of generality is appropriate. It is even unclear
what an intermediate level of generality is, and we cannot expect
that district courts will apply such a concept uniformly in similar
cases.
292
Noting that the majority draws the line at whimsy, Justice
Thomas prefers a clearer rule.293
Finally, Justice Thomas found adequate grounds for revers-
ing Sisson.294 In the area of federal subject-matter jurisdiction,
he believes that ambiguity and vagueness are grounds for
change. 295 Further, the Justice believes that since in other ar-
eas of federal subject-matter jurisdiction the Court demands
clarity and efficiency, there is reason to demand the same
here.2
96
IV. Analysis
The decision in Grubart was the best possible decision in
light of the problems that surround admiralty tort jurisdiction.
Initially, it must be noted that the decision is well reasoned,
both in its extension of the Sisson test and in that test's applica-
tion. However, though the Grubart decision addresses the com-
peting interests affecting admiralty tort jurisdiction-the
interests of judicial economy and restricting the application of
admiralty law to cases where the law was meant to apply-it
still will not satisfy the most ardent advocates of either interest.
Nevertheless, the test adopted is sufficient to remain un-
changed for a long time. Further, the decision is neither an ab-
erration nor a retreat from an intractable problem. Instead, the
Court faced the issue, logically applied the holdings of prior rul-
ings, and fashioned a decision that addresses the competing in-
terests affecting admiralty tort jurisdiction while creating a
catalyst for unity in the lower courts.
292. Id. at 1057-58.
293. See id. at 1058.
294. See Grubart, 115 S. Ct. at 1058-59.
295. See id. at 1058.
296. See id. at 1059.
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In extending the Sisson test to encompass situations where
all of the relevant activities engaged in were not similar, the
Grubart decision removed a meaningless prerequisite to the ap-
plication of the Sisson test. The interest of judicial economy is
not furthered by the prerequisite because judicial resources
would be expended in determining whether all entities involved
were engaged in similar activities. The determination of what
constitutes a "similar activity" itself would waste judicial re-
sources. Further, this expenditure of judicial resources cannot
be justified by arguing that the prerequisite reserves for the ap-
plication of admiralty law only those cases for which admiralty
law was designed. Rather the application of two distinct admi-
ralty tort jurisdiction tests would probably result in the inequi-
table application of admiralty law. Therefore, the expansion of
the Sisson test to incidents where the relevant activities are not
the same merely removed a meaningless barrier to the applica-
tion of a single jurisdictional test.
The Grubart characterization of the nexus aspect of the Sis-
son test is reasonable, but mandating a description of the inci-
dent at an intermediate level of generality, while clarifying the
language of the Sisson test, does not remove the ambiguity in-
herent in the nexus test. However, Justice Thomas' prognosis
that "we cannot expect that district courts will apply such a con-
cept uniformly"297 is overly pessimistic. In its decision, the ma-
jority noted that the second part of the nexus test "turns on the
comparison of traditional maritime activity to the arguably
maritime character of the tortfeasor's activity."298 Thus, at least
in regard to the second part of the nexus test, there is clear gui-
dance in how to describe the incident in a general way. Fur-
ther, the characterizations in Grubart and Sisson demonstrate
how the "intermediate level of generality" should be determined
for both parts of the nexus test.
The characterizations in Sisson and Grubart clearly
demonstrate that the level of generality is determined by the
purposes of the test. The first part of the nexus test determines
whether or not the incident has a potential to disrupt maritime
commerce. 299 In Grubart, the Court characterized the incident
297. Grubart, 115 S. Ct. at 1058.
298. Id. at 1052 (emphasis added).
299. See id. at 1048.
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as "damage by a vessel in navigable water to an underwater
structure."300 Each element of this characterization enables the
Court to make the proper determination without being
weighted down by particularities of no relevance. Without the
phrase, "vessel in navigable water," or if the phrase included
such facts as the vessel being a barge with a crane, the general-
ization would have been improper. A vessel in navigable water
could easily impact maritime commerce, but the fact that the
vessel is a barge with a crane has no bearing on that determina-
tion. Likewise, if the characterization failed to mention that the
structure was underwater, or simply stated that the structure
was an old freight tunnel, the characterization would have been
ineffective because the general characteristics that might impli-
cate maritime concerns are missing.
The second part of the test determines whether or not the
activity giving rise to the incident has a substantial relation to
traditional maritime activity.30' Here, the Court characterized
the activity as "repair or maintenance work on a navigable wa-
terway performed from a vessel."30 2 Simply stating that the ac-
tivity was work performed from a vessel would have been too
broad, for it misses the possible maritime connection. Likewise,
stating that the activity was work on an old freight tunnel
under the Chicago River would have muddied the issue with
irrelevant facts while, again, missing the possible maritime con-
nection. The description of the relevant activities in Sisson30 3 is
subject to the same analysis. There, as in Grubart, the Court
focused on the aspects of the incidents that might have impli-
cated maritime concerns while ignoring particularized facts
that had no bearing, one way or the other, on the potential mar-
itime concerns.30 4 By limiting its descriptions of the incidents to
only those salient characteristics, the Court in Sisson and
Grubart has set forth a clear analytic structure for litigants and
courts.
300. Grubart, 115 S. Ct. at 1051.
301. See id. at 1048.
302. Id. at 1051.
303. See supra notes 208-217 and accompanying text.
304. See id.
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The Grubart majority also found that the structure of the
Sisson test was "familiar and relatively easy."30 5 The factor
tests, on the other hand, would "jettison[ ] relative predictabil-
ity for the open-ended rough-and-tumble of factors, and invit[e]
complex argument in a trial court and a virtually inevitable ap-
peal."30 6 Whether the Court is correct in its assessment of the
predictability of the factor tests, it is clear that now, while the
lower courts are required to carry out a somewhat ambiguous
description of the incident in question, they are not without gui-
dance. Indeed, Grubart has already prompted uniformity in the
circuits, and there does not appear to be any particular problem
in applying the Grubart test.
The movement toward uniformity can be seen in two partic-
ular cases. In McClenahan v. Paradise Cruises, Ltd., a district
court in the District of Hawai'i found that Grubart overruled
the multi-factor aspect of the Delta County Ventures v.
Magana3 7 test.308 In Coats v. Penrod Drilling Corp., the Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found that Grubart had over-
ruled its prior "factor" approach first instituted by Kelly.30 9 Nor
have these, or any of the other post-Grubart cases found the
Grubert test particularly problematic in application.3 10
Further, the "intermediate level of generality" mandated in
Grubart is designed to allow only those cases for which admi-
ralty law was designed to pass the jurisdictional test. There-
fore, the judicial resources used to describe the incidents in
question will not be wasted.
Those who disagree with applying a nexus test for admi-
ralty tort jurisdiction are also concerned with judicial econ-
omy.3 11 However, it is impossible to ignore the arguments of
those who find the strict locality test ineffective. 31 2 A jurisdic-
tional test that does not restrict the application of a body of law
305. Grubart, 115 S. Ct. at 1055.
306. Id.
307. 986 F.2d 1260 (9th Cir. 1993).
308. 888 F. Supp. at 123.
309. 61 F.3d at 1118.
310. See cases cited supra note 29.
311. See Grubart, 115 S. Ct. 1056 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring); Sisson, 497
U.S. at 374-75 (Scalia, J., concurring); See generally, Piekson, supra note 207;
Carmilla & Drzal, supra note 207; Raizner, supra note 207.
312. See supra notes 116-19 and accompanying text.
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to those cases for which the law was designed is not effective.
Further, the history of admiralty tort jurisdiction clearly sup-
ports the primacy of the concern to limit admiralty jurisdiction
to cases for which the law was designed. The history of admi-
ralty jurisdiction is one of expansion and retraction. However,
this apparent contradictory motion is consistent in that it re-
flects a persistent judicial and legislative desire to connect ad-
miralty tort jurisdiction to the bounds of admiralty law.
The initial changes to the locality test expanded the reach
of admiralty jurisdiction. In The Propeller Genesee Chief, the
Court extended the reach of admiralty jurisdiction from the
seas, ports and extent of the ebb and flow of the tide to all navi-
gable water. In making its decision, the Court determined that
commerce on waterways had extended beyond the limited reach
of the locality test.313 In The Blackheath, the Court expanded
the reach of admiralty jurisdiction to those government aids to
navigation traditionally within the reach of admiralty law.314
Finally, Congress expanded the reach of admiralty law in order
to avoid the inequities that came with strict adherence to The
Plymouth decision which restricted admiralty tort jurisdiction
to cases where both the tort and injury were consummated on
navigable water.316 Though expanding the reach of admiralty
law, these expansions of the test were aimed at applying admi-
ralty law to cases that were admiralty in nature in the practical
assessment of the matter.
After this wave of expansion, courts began to restrict the
reach of admiralty law. The impetus was strong. King v. Tes-
terman, Davis v. City of Jacksonville, McGuire and Chapman
demonstrated the need for a jurisdictional test that requires
more than a mere showing of location. Each involved injury to
individuals engaged in recreational activity with only negligible
possible impact on commercial maritime activity.316 The cases
that refused to strictly apply the locality test, McGuire and
Chapman, both found location to be a rule of limitation as op-
313. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
314. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
315. See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
316. See supra notes 90-95, 98-108 and accompanying text. King v. Tes-
terman is the only case which comes close to satisfring the current test. See supra
notes 90-92.
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posed to a determinative test.317 Both courts also found that ad-
miralty jurisdiction was properly linked to the business of
maritime commerce. 318 After McGuire and Chapman, even
cases with a more obvious connection to maritime commerce
employed a nexus test.319
Cases involving airplane crashes in navigable water best
demonstrate the need for a change in the strict application of
the locality test. While strict adherence to the locality test
clearly requires finding admiralty jurisdiction when planes
crash in navigable water, there is a natural hesitancy in apply-
ing admiralty law to situations involving plane crashes. Thus,
whether by coincidence or otherwise, it is not surprising that
the Supreme Court first moved away from the strict application
of the locality test in a case involving a plane crash.
Therefore, an admiralty jurisdiction test based on more
than mere locality, though a substantial shift in the law at the
time it was instituted, was not an aberration. Rather, the
change was a single step in a long journey in American law to-
ward linking the jurisdictional test for admiralty law to mari-
time commerce-the subject for which admiralty law is
designed. Thus, the return to the locality test advocated by Jus-
tices Thomas and Scalia would be an aberration both in light of
recent Supreme Court rulings, and in light of the history of ad-
miralty tort jurisdiction.
V. Conclusion
As long as there are concerns over the efficient use of judi-
cial resources, there will be debate over jurisdictional tests-
especially those that require some factual scrutiny. Such is the
case with the test for admiralty tort jurisdiction. Those who
want a test that allows only "true" admiralty cases to be subject
to admiralty law will always advocate a jurisdictional test that
requires greater judicial scrutiny of the factual setting of a case.
Those who are concerned with judicial efficiency will not advo-
cate such a jurisdictional test. Though proponents of either
view will probably not be satisfied with the current admiralty
317. See McGuire, 192 F. Supp. at 869; Chapman, 385 F.2d at 966.
318. See McGuire, 192 F. Supp. at 871; Chapman, 385 F.2d at 965-66.
319. See supra notes 109-111 and accompanying text.
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tort jurisdiction test, this test is the culmination of many years
of judicial reasoning and reflects and addresses the concerns ex-
pressed over the years. Further, the relative ease with which
the courts have adopted the test described in Grubart indicates
that judicial resources are not being wasted.
Dale Van Demark*
* I would like to thank my wife Michelle for her endless patience over the past
three years.
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